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There is no doubt that the criminal prosecution of the "Catalan question" is a stress
test for Spanish Justice. One of the last episodes, now with a European dimension,
has been the "euro-immunity" of Junqueras. And, in this respect, the political and
journalistic readings of the judicial decisions issued by the Spanish Supreme Court
and by the Court of Justice of the European Union emphasize the confrontation.
However, in my modest opinion, I believe that these decisions are an example of
dialogue between courts, necessary to manage the current pluralism where legal
orders are intertwined without clear hierarchies. Neither the Court of Justice in its
ruling of December 19, nor the Spanish Supreme Court in its order last January 9,
have undermined the other and their decisions have left enough space to avoid a
direct collision using solid legal arguments. This is how courts should act, far from
political noise.
As is well known, the Luxembourg Court concluded in its judgment that "the status
of member of the European Parliament derives from the fact of being elected by
suffrage" and is acquired with the official proclamation of the results of the election.
From that moment MEPs would enjoy the immunity provided in art. 9.2 of the
Protocol on privileges and immunities of the Union, which refers to their freedom
of movement "while they are travelling to and from the place of meeting of the
European Parliament". As a result of which the Court of Justice declared that the
Spanish Supreme Court should have lifted the pretrial detention of Junqueras so
as to allow him to take possession as a MEP. At the same time, in order not to
corner the Supreme Court, the Court of Justice admitted that exceptionally this
restrictive measure could be maintained on condition that the national court request
the European Parliament "as soon as possible" to lift immunity.
Now, in the resolution mentioned above, the Supreme Court has ruled that
Junqueras must comply with the prison sentence that had been imposed in a final
sentence. Besides, the Supreme Court has declared that request the European
Parliament to lift immunity no longer makes sense. A cursory reading of this decision
could lead to the conclusion – wrong, in my opinion –, that the Supreme Court faces
the Court of Justice or even the European Parliament, and that, given the result, the
Supreme Court could have saved the question for a preliminary ruling.
However, in my opinion, the Supreme Court loyally has assumed the "new"
Luxembourg’s doctrine. First, the Supreme Court has recognized the status of MEP
since the proclamation as elected. Although, since they are not relevant to the
cause, the Supreme Court has not entered into other subsequent consequences
of this statement: whether the recognition as a MEP should be understood for the
sole purpose of immunities (as could be understood from § 81 of the Luxembourg’s
ruling), or if, on the contrary, the national provisions that impose certain requirements
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for the full acquisition of the status as MEPs – in the Spanish case, to swear or
promise the Constitution – must be understood as contrary to the law of the Union.
The Advocate General had held this last position in his conclusions – § 52 – and can
also rely on § 69 of the Luxembourg’s ruling. A matter of great interest for the cases
of Puigdemont and Comín but that remains for the moment open until the General
Court resolves it.
The Supreme Court has also come to terms with the "extensive interpretation" that
Luxembourg makes of the immunity recognized in art. 9.2 of the Protocol, warning
that it is an immunity of "autonomous configuration", typical of European law and
which do not have to correspond to the national concept of immunity. However, does
the Luxembourg´s ruling imply that the Supreme Court could have not concluded
the main proceedings without first asking European Parliament to lift immunity? The
Supreme Court has understood that no. In its opinion, among the different ways of
conceiving immunity, the one established in paragraph 2 of art. 9 of the Protocol is
limited to the "formal prohibition of proceeding with [the] detention [of a MEP] when
they address the Parliament, are in it or return"; but it does not imply a prohibition
that judicial proceedings can take place without the authorization of Parliament. It is
just "freedom from arrest".
Moreover, MEPs can enjoy broader immunity following paragraph 1 of art. 9 of
the Protocol. In particular, in this case, Junqueras had enjoyed "in the territory of
their own State, the immunities accorded to members of their parliament". And,
according to Spanish law, the Court does not have to ask Parliament to lift immunity
when the oral trial had been opened before the person was elected. The trial started
in February 2019 and finished June 12, one day before the proclamation of the
electoral results. So, Junqueras enjoyed immunity according to with Luxembourg
rule since his proclamation as an elected member, but, taking into in consideration
the Spanish law, the Spanish Supreme Court was able to give judgment without
asking the European Parliament because the trial was previous.
Restricting the scope of immunity in this cases makes full constitutional sense: It is
teleologically impossible that the constitutional end of this prerogative can be given
when the condition of Member of the Parliament was acquired after the trial. We
cannon forget that "The purpose of parliamentary immunity is to protect Parliament
and its Members from legal proceedings in relation to activities carried out in the
performance of parliamentary duties and which cannot be separated from those
duties" (Committee on Legal Affairs. European Parliament, Notice to Members on
Principles for immunity cases, 0011/2019).
This helps to understand that the Supreme Court did not wait for the Luxembourg’s
decision to the preliminary ruling to resolve the main proceedings. The preliminary
ruling was focus on an incidental issue about the custody of Junqueras but did not
affect the competence of the Supreme Court to prosecute the facts. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has provided other reasons that endorse why it had resolved without
waiting for the Luxembourg decision (the trial was already finished, people were in
custody waiting for the ruling…).
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Thus, currently, as the Supreme Court has resolved, Junqueras has lost his status
as a MEP in the application of European and national rules on incompatibilities,
having been sentenced to imprisonment and a disqualification from holding any
public office or exercising any public function. So the European Parliament has
responded correctly by not currently recognizing him as a Member.
Two questions remain open: According to the Luxembourg’s ruling, was the
Supreme Court obliged to ask the European Parliament to lift immunity if it did not
leave Junqueras free to take possession as a MEP? Yes, although the Spanish
Supreme Court also explains why it would have been "sterile", since the European
Parliament itself did not recognize him as a MEP at that time. Both the European
Commission and the European Parliament defended before the Court of Justice that
Junqueras could not be considered MEP because he had not met the requirements
of national legislation to access the position. When the Court of Justice had changed
this interpretation (something that was not foreseeable at that time), the Spanish
Supreme Court has requested to the European Parliament to lift the immunity to
Puigdemont and Comín. In addition, the Supreme Court also explains the compelling
reasons that led to not releasing Junqueras – among others, the flight risk due to the
lack of collaboration of the judicial authorities of other countries with the European
Arrest Warrant-. And finally, does the fact that the Supreme Court had not asked
the European Parliament to lift immunity imply the nullity of the main proceedings?
No, because, as it has been said, the request for waiver of the immunity was
only necessary in relation to the pretrial detention, but it did not affect the main
proceedings, which had been carried out with all the guarantees before Junqueras
had been elected MEP. At most, Junqueras may now argue that the decision of the
Supreme Court adopted in the incidental question of not allowing him to travel to the
European Parliament without requesting that his immunity be lifted has violated his
right to the exercise of representative office (art. 23 Spanish Constitution). A matter
that is outside, as I said, of the main process. And it is precisely this last question
that, in my opinion, justifies that the Supreme Court maintained the question referred
for a preliminary ruling even though it did not have direct effects on the current
situation of Junqueras.
To conclude, I believe that It must be recognized the Supreme Court’s consideration
towards the European legal order, presenting the question for a preliminary
ruling and giving a response respectful of the European Union law. I wish other
national courts that have resolved issues related to this case would have been so
sensitive to European law. In particular, I wish the German or Belgian courts would
have presented a preliminary ruling in relation to the European Arrest Warrant
in the Puigdemont’s case. The Luxembourg’s ruling leaves, on the other hand,
an important task for the European institutions that will have to advance in the
standardization of European electoral provisions, as López Garrido has pointed
out. However, I disagree with Professor van Elsuwege when he has argued that it
is "A matter of representative democracy in the European Union". In my opinion,
what is at stake is respect for judicial independence, equality before the law, and
separation of powers. Parliamentary immunities cannot be a source of impunity.
That is why, no matter how much now in Europe the judicial drift of countries like
Hungary or Poland may concern, the interpretation of these prerogatives must be
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restrictive where there is a full democracy, as in Spain. Following the principles
given by the Venice Commission itself. The "Catalan question" is not a case of
"lawfare", but the response of a Democratic State based in the Rule of Law, through
an independent Judicial Power, to those who abandoned their political legitimacy by
breaking the constitutional order, repeatedly disobeying the Constitutional Court, with
misappropriation of public funds for illegal acts, and mobilizing citizens to prevent
compliance of judicial decisions. A response that is also subject to the review of the
corresponding national and supranational guarantee courts, especially the European
Court of Human Rights. In addition, any commentator on the Catalan question must
know that there were legal channels to express those political demands within the
framework of the Spanish constitutional order. Even, if the Government wants to
intervene politically in what had been judicially resolved, there is also a constitutional
way: the pardon – without entering to value its political opportunity or not-; but never
impunity.
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